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Abstract This paper disaggregates the various sources of rural income growth in
Peru between 2004 and 2012 and shows that about 80% of the increase came from
rising earnings and only 15% from transfer programs. This increase in rural earnings
was not led by agriculture. It was mainly because of a general rise in wages across
industrial and services activities within the rural population, coupled with a massive
movement of the better educated from the rural to the urban areas of the Sierra and
Selva. Rapid overall growth rate of the economy permitted an increase in average
wages both in the urban receiving areas and for the smaller labor force left behind in
the rural sector. In analyzing changes in poverty over time, it is important to
distinguish what happens to a given age cohort from changes in the income of
different deciles of the distribution. The paper creates a quasi-panel by equivalent
cohort. The panel shows that first, there was tremendous progress made in rural
poverty reduction among those who were poor in 2004. That is true in both the rural
and urban sectors. There were 6.3 million rural poor in 2004. 46% of them or almost
three million got out of poverty over the period. Second, it is instructive that 62% of
the group that got out of poverty stayed in the rural sector. In other words, almost
two thirds of rural poverty reduction was due to increases in rural family income not
rural–urban migration. Third, among the rural poor, it was the young who migra-
ted—64% of total rural–urban migration of the poor came from the 0–25 cohort
even though it comprised less than 60% of the rural poverty population in 2004.
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1 Introduction
The period since year 2000 has seen remarkable world-wide progress in poverty
reduction. But most of this progress is urban. Much less progress has been attained
in the rural sector where about 45% of the rural population is still poor. Reaching
the MDG goal of halving rural poverty rates over the 1990–2015 period has not
been met. Rapid growth has helped but most poverty reduction has been urban, not
rural. Devising a strategy to reduce rural poverty is one of the most significant
challenges facing development experts.
Peru is both a good example of the problem and a guide to possible solutions. It has
always had a rural poverty problem. Even during the decades when Peru grew
rapidly, most of the progress was either in the urban sector or on the coast. Over the
8-year period 2004–2012, there was a boom in Peru. Per capita income increased by
over 5.5% per year and total poverty was cut by almost 60%.1 But over two thirds of
that reduction was urban. Urban poverty fell from 48% of the urban population in
2004 to only 16% 8 years later. Rural poverty rates fell too, but not nearly as fast.
That would not present too much of a problem if the rural poverty population was
small. But it is not. It comprised 47% of all the poverty in the country in 2012, and
was concentrated in the highAndeswheremost of the rural population lives. This has
always presented Peru with a vexing political problem, increasing the level of
inequality and exacerbating the ethnic divisions within the country.
Thanks to the extended economic boom of the last 10 years, Peru is well on its
way to reducing urban poverty to first world levels. Even though rural poverty has
not fallen nearly as quickly and has shown itself to be relatively insensitive to
government efforts at poverty reduction, still Peru is one of only ten countries in the
entire world for which we have comparable data where rural poverty has fallen by at
least 3% per year since the millennium (Inchauste et al. 2012). Thus, Peru is both a
good example of the rural poverty problem, and a possible guide to a successful
strategy for rural poverty reduction. No one should imagine that reducing rural
poverty in Peru was going to be easy. The amount of arable land per capita in the
Andes is small, the climate is dry and cold and most of the rural population lives at
least 10,000 feet above sea level (Morley 2011). Yet Peru despite these structural
handicaps managed to reduce the rural poverty rate from 85% in 2004 to 55%
8 years later. How did they do this? That is the central question we want to address
in this paper.2 What role was played by rapid growth, sectoral growth in agriculture,
rural–urban migration, government transfers, and improvements in education? What
lessons can we learn from the Peruvian experience that can be transferred to other
countries with a significant rural poverty problem? We will attempt to answer these
questions by means of an analysis of two recent living standards measurement
1 For an analysis of the previous decade see Escobal and Ponce (2011).
2 For a case study of various programs to increase agricultural incomes and productivity in the Andes, see
Morley (2009).
 1 Page 2 of 20 Lat Am Econ Rev  (2017) 26:1 
123
surveys, one in 2004 adjusted by updated population weights and a second in 2012.3
These are big comparable national surveys from which the statistics on poverty in
this paper are drawn.
In section two of the paper we present an overview of the evidence from the
surveys and disaggregate changes in family income over time. We calculate the
fraction of the total change that was due to transfers, demographic factors and
earned income. We show that far and away the largest factor for rural families was
the growth in earned income. It came mainly from wages and mainly from
employment growth in industrial or service sector activities, not from agriculture.
In section three, we have found it informative to disaggregate the 2012 survey by
what we will call equivalent cohorts by which we mean the age groups of 2004 as
they appear 8 years later in 2012. Ideally we would like to be able to follow
individuals over time using panel data. Unfortunately we do not have panel data.
But the equivalent cohort treatment is what one could call a quasi-panel since it
follows a given age cohort over time, using surveys that are both large and
representative. Their use gives a significantly different picture of poverty reduction
or rural–urban migration than the usual treatment.
The equivalent cohort approach permits us to construct mobility matrices in
section four of the paper. The first such matrix shows the movement of the 2004
population between the rural and urban areas and between the Sierra-Selva and the
Coastal regions. It shows us how the rural population of the Sierra has been drawn
to the urban sector, particularly within the Sierra itself. We also construct a second
mobility matrix, this one by poverty, sector and cohort. This matrix quantifies the
significant upward mobility of the 2004 rural and urban poverty population and
gives a better understanding of the sources of rural poverty reduction by age and
sector. It also quantifies an important distinction between poverty reduction and
upward mobility as a measure of progress.
Section five summarizes our findings and concludes with policy implications that
can be drawn from the Peruvian case.
2 An overview of the evidence
Table 1 gives the raw data from the household surveys upon which all of our
analysis will be based.4 As the reader can see, there has been an impressive amount
of poverty reduction in Peru since 2004. Most of it is urban, but even so rural
poverty fell by at least 2.5 million, and the rate of extreme poverty fell over 50%.
These are impressive reductions by any measure, and our interest is going to be to
shed light on the factors that led to these results.
3 The data for these comparisons come from the surveys made available on the INEI website and
analyzed in this paper. The 2004 survey has been adjusted using the updated population weights from the
2007 Demographic Census.
4 Peru has an annual living standards measurement survey covering around 25,000 households and
100,000 individuals. The survey includes detailed information by individual on personal characteristics,
family status, sources of income and expenditures all subdivided by department and region. See http://
www.INEI.gob.pe.
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2.1 The decomposition of changes in family income over time
In this paper we are going to disaggregate the changes over time in reported income
as well as track what happened to different cohorts of the population (Azevedo et al.
2014). To do that we use two detailed household surveys, one from 2004 and the
other from 2012. The original 2004 survey was based on population weights from an
early population census. These weights were updated using data from the 2007
demographic census. The Peruvian Census Bureau (INEI) then updated the 2004
survey. This is the 2004 base that we used to get comparable statistics for 2004 and
2012. Our poverty estimates are slightly different from those published by INEI
because some respondents in either of the two surveys did not report either age,
income or place of residence. This underreporting is small enough that we are
confident that the changes we will analyze here are representative of the entire
universe of households in Peru.
Leaving the consumption–income relationship aside, we now concentrate on the
determinants of changes in family income per capita.5 Households are the main
redistributive instrument in all societies. They consolidate earnings by a subset of
family members and then distribute the total of earned income among all the
members of the family. The economy affects the distribution indirectly, through its
effects on earners. But demographic factors play a role too. Obviously the ratio of
income recipients to dependents or to the total size of the family is an important
determinant of how much money will be available to distribute among all family
members.
The household surveys give us an estimate of household income and the
population receiving that income for 2004 and 2012 in both the rural and urban
Table 1 Poverty data for 2004–2012 in Peru by urban–rural
Rural and urban poverty shares Population shares Poverty incidence INEI
Extreme Total Extreme Total
2004
Rural 0.72 0.39 0.26 0.43 0.85 0.83
Urban 0.28 0.61 0.74 0.06 0.48 0.48
National 0.16 0.57
2012
Rural 0.76 0.47 0.22 0.21 0.55 0.53
Urban 0.24 0.53 0.78 0.02 0.18 0.17
National 0.06 0.26
Source: All the data in this paper come from INEI household surveys using the updated population
weights from the 2007 Demographic Census. Poverty estimates are based on family consumption per
capita compared to official regional poverty lines. Because we want to disaggregate the data by age and
place of residence our poverty estimates are slightly different than the official poverty figures published
by INEI and show in the last column of the table. Estimates are based on family income per capita
5 We switch from expenditure to income here so that we can decompose the changes in income upon
which changes in expenditure must be based.
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sectors. Household income is split into earnings, transfers and other. Since we are
interested in the effect of economic growth in general and agriculture in particular,
it is useful to separate the part directly affected by the market from the part coming
from transfers and other (see Table 2). Earnings is defined as the sum of all income
from labor, either direct payments, payments in kind from primary or secondary
occupations or earnings from self-employment in agriculture or the informal sector.
Transfers include public and private transfers both domestic and foreign. The
category other includes all other sources of revenue. For the rural area as a whole,
between 2004 and 2012 reported per capita income increased from 1430 soles to
3170 soles and the population shrank by 9%. The table tells us that 80% or 1392 of
the observed change of 1740 soles came from changes in the earnings component
and only 20% from the two non-earned income components. Increases in non-
earned income are not the main reason for rural poverty reduction. The main
impetus came from the increase in earned income.
We now want to look behind these aggregate results. Both earned and non-earned
income can be further subdivided into demographic and income factors. There were
three important demographic shifts going on between 2004 and 2012 each of which
could have an effect on the change on income per capita. First there was
outmigration from the rural sector. Total rural population shrank from 7.8 million to
Table 2 Sources of monthly income (per capita)
2004 2012
Earned Transfers Other Total income Earned Transfers Other Total income
Urban 3392 494 1164 5050 6639 663 2032 9334
Rural 977 75 378 1430 2369 171 630 3170
Growth rate of income (2012/2004)-1 Absolute change in income
Earned Transfers Other Total income Earned Transfers Other Total income
Urban 1.25 0.54 1.00 1.12 3247 169 868 4284
Rural 1.21 1.08 0.52 1.02 1392 96 252 1740
Hypothetical income with constant pop. Change with constant population
Earned Unearned income Total income Earned Unearned Total
Urban 7617 3092 10,708 4225 1434 5659
Rural 2157 729 2886 1180 276 1456
Hypothetical income with just migration Change with just migration
Earned Unearned income Total income Earned Unearned Total
Urban 2956 1445 4401 -435 -213 -648
Rural 1073 497 1571 96 45 141
Source: author’s worksheets based on the INEI household surveys. Data are in soles per month. Italicized
entries are mentioned in the text explanation of this table
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7.1 million. Second, the number of households and the amount of employment
increased and third, there were important changes in the dependency ratio or the
number of family members per earner or per family. With respect to earned income
a part of the observed change must have been due to changes in average earnings
per labor force participant and part to the change in the number of earners. In
Table 2, we show our estimate of the decomposition of all these changes.
Consider now the earnings component of household income per capita in the
rural sector.6 This is the part that is directly affected by conditions in the rural labor
market. Here earnings go to individuals to be later lumped together with other
sources of family income. But since we are interested in labor income across
individuals grouped together into families there are three separate effects to consider
average wages, employment and demographic factors. It turns out that there has
been a large decrease in both average family size and in the ratio of family members
to earners (the dependency ratio).7 That is true for the country as a whole and for the
Sierra-Selva considered separately. Average family size has fallen from 4.45 to 3.9
between 2004 and 2012. The national dependency ratio has fallen from 2.15 to 1.74,
and the decline can be seen in all our rural and urban subsamples and for the Sierra-
Selva subsample. In 2004, the average adult had to support over two dependents, but
only 1.7, 8 years later. Even if there had been no progress in the economy over the
period, or if average wages had been stagnant, this change would permit an increase
in per capita consumption simply because more people were working or receiving
pensions and transfers and average family sizes had dropped.
How much of the change in total labor income came from changes in income
received and how much from changes in the population receiving income? The data
permit us to calculate total household income from labor earnings, transfers and
pensions. Following our previous thought experiment, we construct several
hypothetical 2012 earnings per capita. First hold the population constant at the
2004 level. Then as shown by the italicized entry in Table 2 the hypothetical
earnings per capita in the rural sector is total rural earnings in 2012 divided by the
rural population of 2004 or 2157 soles. That is what monthly labor income per
capita would have been if there had been the observed rate of growth of
employment and wages with a constant population. But actual rural earned income
per capita was 2369 soles (see Table 2). At this point we cannot disaggregate the
change in income into changes in employment and changes in the average wage
rate. But we see that had the rural population been constant, income would have
risen from 977 to 2157 soles. Instead it rose to 2369 soles because the rural
population fell. Since the observed change in earned income per capita was 1392
soles, we estimate that 85% (1180/1392) came from the growth in rural earned
income and 15% or 212 came from the fall in the rural population.
6 Note that the estimates here are national. Most rural poverty in Peru is in the Sierra-Selva region which
we track using mobility matrices later in the paper.
7 Note that this measure of dependency is derived from the household files which have a variable called
number of receivers of income. That includes people receiving pensions and transfers, not just earned
income. In other words, those receiving retirement income and or transfers will be counted as income
recipients and introduced into the calculation of the dependency ratio shown in the table.
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Consider next non-earned rural income. If we assume that non-labor income is
independent of demographic factors, then what is relevant is simply total non-labor
income distributed across the observed population. For simplicity and as a first
approximation assume that the 2012 amount of transfers and other income is
invariant relative to the number of recipients. Then the effect of demographic
factors is what per capita transfers in 2012 would have been with the base period
population. Actual non-earned income per capita in 2012 was 801 soles.
(171 ? 630) Had the rural population remained at the 2004 level, non-earned
income would have been 729 soles.8 In other words outmigration increased per
capita non-earned income by 72 soles. To put this another way, the increase in non-
earned income to the base period population was 276 soles. Since the observed
change in non-earned income per capita between 2004 and 2012 was 348 soles, we
estimate that 21% of that change came from a reduction in the rural population (72/
348) and 79% from the direct increase in transfers and other income received by the
remaining rural population (276/348).
The important point here is that most of the observed increase in rural income per
capita came from the growth in labor income rather than demographic factors. One
might have imagined that the outmigration and the reduction in the dependency rate
would be equally important, but they are not, at least not directly.9 Altogether gains
in labor income contributed 68% of the observed increase in rural income per capita
from all sources while the increase in unearned income contributed 16% and the
reduction of rural population an additional 16%.10 That means that most of the story
of poverty reduction and increases in rural income in the rural sector in Peru were
the result of increases in labor income in the countryside, rather than transfers or
demographic factors. This is an important point.
2.2 Sectoral employment and wages
Next we look at sectoral employment (see Table 3). As we have seen, 80% of the
increase in rural family income per capita came from the growth in labor income.
We would now like to go behind the changes in earned income to see how much
came from the growth in agricultural and non-agricultural employment and how
much from a growth in average earnings. To get sectoral information for workers,
we are forced to use a subset of the entire household survey because it is the only
source of detailed sectoral information per earner. The problem is that it is limited to
earners over the age of 14 who are in the labor force. That may impart a bias if some
8 This is a lower bound estimate given our assumption that total transfer income was unaffected by the
fall in the rural population.
9 Note that the reduction in the labor force in the rural sector is at least partly responsible for the increase
in rural wages, but we would need a model of rural labor markets to estimate how important that factor
may have been.
10 We know that the earnings contribution to total rural income growth was 80%, unearned income 20%.
We also estimate that 85% of rural income growth came from earnings and only 15% from the fall in the
rural population. We, therefore, estimate that earnings contributed 85% of 80 or 68% of total income
growth, while unearned income contributed 0.79 9 0.20 or 16%, assuming a constant population. The
reduction in the rural population directly contributed 15% of 80% plus 21% of 20% or 16%.
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family members in the big household survey are family members under the age of
14 working on family farms or are retired heads of household whose income comes
from pensions and transfers. This means that we cannot get a precise decomposition
of the changes in Table 3. Instead we can get a pretty accurate idea of the main
factors driving the big increase in the earned income component in Table 3.
The first and most important result of the analysis of the employment and income
data for those over 14 for which we have sectoral information is that there is a very
sharp decline in the share and the absolute numbers employed in agriculture.
Agriculture comprised 79% of rural employment in 2004 but only 62%, 8 years
later. There was some growth in both the share and the absolute numbers in
manufacturing, but the bulk of rural job creation was clearly in the tertiary sector,
particularly commerce, finance, tourism and other social services.
The data also permit one to calculate total earned income by sector for all those
reporting income from which one can calculate the average wage. Note that the
absolute numbers of workers for this calculation are smaller than those underlying
Table 3, but are internally consistent with the wage information shown in Table 4.
Wages went up in real terms across the board. But they went up faster in agriculture
than in either of the other two sectors. Indeed they closed half of the rural–urban
income gap over the period.
Since we also know that rural employment fell, this rise in rural wages has to be
the main reason why family earnings per capita in the rural sector increased. It was
not because the primary sector created more jobs. It did not. It seems that workers
got pulled out of primary as urban jobs opened up. They cannot have been pushed
out of the sector because that would have implied a widening of the rural–urban
wage gap.
What this shows is that the increase in labor income that we noted earlier in the
rural sector came mainly from a very large increase in wages. The actual
employment in the primary sector fell, though that is offset by rising employment in
both manufacturing and the tertiary sector. But what really makes a difference is the
Table 3 Sectoral employment by location in 2004–2012
Employment Share of total employment
Primary Secondary Tertiary Total Primary Secondary Tertiary
2004
Urban 1,085,943 1,179,389 6,249,241 8,514,573 0.13 0.14 0.73
Rural 2,476,882 174,502 465,945 3,117,329 0.79 0.06 0.15
Total 3,562,825 1,353,891 6,715,186 11,631,902 0.31 0.12 0.58
2012
Urban 795,219 1,498,167 8,081,899 10,375,285 0.08 0.14 0.78
Rural 1,348,015 190,384 626,068 2,164,467 0.62 0.09 0.29
Total 2,143,235 1,688,551 8,707,967 12,539,752 0.17 0.13 0.69
Source: author’s worksheets based in the INEI household surveys
In the share part of the table the rows sum to one
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growth in average rural wages.11 Overall rural employment hardly moves, but there
is a shift from primary to secondary and tertiary employment. What seems to have
happened was the creation of a dynamic urban economy particularly in the Sierra-
Selva region where the 89% of the rural poor lived.12 That raised income and
employment in the urban areas and drew the working age population out of the rural
areas of the sierra. That in turn permitted wages to rise in the rural area, particularly
for workers in the manufacturing and services sub sectors.
3 Cohort analysis
In thinking about mobility, migration or poverty reduction, it is useful to do the
analysis using equivalent cohorts. We are interested in tracking what happens to
certain groups such as the rural population or the young. That would be relatively
simple if we had a panel. But our successive surveys are not a panel so we cannot
follow the same individuals over time. But we can do something which is roughly
equivalent so long as our surveys are large and representative which is to follow
equivalent age group cohorts over time. For example, the cohort 30–35 in 2004 is
the cohort 38–43, 8 years later. The data have to be adjusted for a certain number of
Table 4 Average earned income by sector
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Average earned income by sector
2004
Urban 12.29 21.79 19.09
Rural 10.17 13.56 18.80
Total 10.88 20.63 19.07
2012
Urban 25.33 33.04 33.02
Rural 21.50 33.55 34.83
Total 22.92 33.10 33.15
Primary (%) Secondary (%) Tertiary (%)
Yearly growth in real earnings (%)
Urban 6.5 2.4 4.1
Rural 6.8 8.9 5.0
Total 6.7 3.2 4.2
Source: author’s worksheets based on INEI surveys. Data are monthly earnings per employee
These are implicit wages = total labor income divided by total employment. The growth in real earnings
in bottom panel deflate the top panels by the CPI of Peru with 2004 equal to 1.00
11 Note that this rise in rural earnings occurred in spite of the world-wide financial crisis which mainly
affected agricultural exports from the coast.
12 In 2004, 89% of rural poverty was in the Sierra-Selva. That rose to 92% by 2012.
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deaths and outmigration, especially in older cohorts, but once we have done that we
can make a good estimate of rural to urban migration, mobility, and changes in
poverty because the groups from successive surveys are comparable, and the
estimates of poverty or migration will be for particular groups of people such as
those who were in the rural sector or the Sierra in the base year (see Tables 5, 6)
That will not be the same as the simple comparisons of rural poverty or poverty in
the Sierra at two points in time and the differences may be instructive.13
There are two advantages to this procedure. First it allows us to pinpoint the
cohorts with rapid rates of poverty reduction and or rural–urban migration. It also
allows us to see whether or not some of the changes in reported poverty are the
spurious result of change in cohort weights or whether they come from differential
rates of migration or death rates. We can also use the cohort analysis to identify the
impact of rural–urban migration on poverty rates in both the rural and urban sectors,
since we know that if the size of each cohort is fixed then the sum of changes in
location or job switching have to net to zero.
Cohort analysis is also useful for thinking about mobility and migration.
Typically, when addressing the question of mobility, economists look at the poverty
or income level of the same age cohort over time. They ask what happened to the
average income or poverty of 25–35-year-olds in the period between two household
surveys. That is not an uninteresting question, but it begs the mobility question
because that age cohort is composed of different people in the later year. From the
point of view of society, it is useful and interesting to know how 25–35-year-olds
are faring relative to the rest of the population. But from the individual point of
view, what is important is how they are faring relative to the rest of their cohort, or
how their own cohort is faring over time. That is easy to see when thinking about
poverty statistics. Typically, poverty rates are calculated using successive household
surveys. But the people in poverty in year t in a country may not the same people
who were in the poverty population in an earlier year because a large number of the
Table 5 Poverty rates by equivalent cohort and rural–urban








Urban 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.16
Rural 0.21 0.55 0.19 0.52
Source: author worksheets. Note that the reported poverty figures
In the LH columns use our adjusted data from table one
13 Morley (1981) developed the cohort-poverty analysis formally.
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poor are young. In most countries, the young improve their income and
consumption as they get older. Many of those in poverty move out of poverty,
but are replaced by a new group of the young. From the point of view of society this
distinction between what happens to those who were impoverished at some point in
time and those who are at the bottom of the income pyramid at different points in
time may not be important. But for the poor at a point in time, the difference is
crucial. What we might call the base period poor may well be getting out of poverty
and moving up the consumption or income pyramid, even though the aggregate
poverty indicators as generally measured do not show that.
First we split the sample into four cohort aggregates that conform to the 2004
groupings 8 years later. That is the 0–25 group is now the 8–33-year-old group, and
so on. Obviously the 0–8 cohort was not in the sample in 2004 so they are excluded
from these estimates. Likewise some unknown number from each cohort have died
or migrated out of Peru. We then take the cohorts representing the same age groups,
and disaggregate their poverty estimates by urban and rural for 2012 and show the
result in Table 5 and the national result by age cohort in Table 6. The left-hand
columns in both tables show the poverty rates as reported in Table 1. In the right-
hand columns we have split the sample into three cohort aggregates that conform to
the 2004 groupings 8 years later. If we look at just at the equivalent cohorts for the
rural–urban sectors in Table 5 where we have dropped the 0–8 cohort, all the
incidence figures drop a bit since poverty incidence is always highest in the
youngest cohorts.
We then take the cohorts representing the same age groups, and show the national
poverty rates as reported and by equivalent cohort in Table 6. The national poverty
rate for those alive in 2004 and 2012 is 2.2 percentage points lower than what has
been reported partly because poverty incidence is highest in the youngest cohorts
and partly because there is more upward mobility among equivalent cohorts than is
implied by comparing poverty by age group.
3.1 Poverty reduction and rural to urban migration
Now we are in a position to ask how much of the overall poverty reduction in Peru
came from rural–urban migration in the equivalent age cohorts. In 2004, the total
rural population was 7.8 million persons 85% of whom were poor. Eight years later
the rural population had shrunk to 7.1 million and poverty incidence to 55%. Of
those who were alive in 2004 and in the rural sector (7.4 million), only 6 million
Table 6 Poverty rates
Cohort As reported 2012
2004 2012 Equivalent P0
0–25 0.64 0.30 8–33 0.28
26–60 0.51 0.22 34–68 0.21
[60 0.48 0.23 [68 0.24
Total 0.57 0.26 0.24
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were still in the rural sector 8 years later (see Table 9).14 That is rural to urban
migration and other demographic effects in the comparable cohorts reduced the
rural population by 1.4 million persons (7.4–6.0). We can now estimate how much
this reduction in the number of people reduced rural poverty using the Oaxaca–
Blinder decomposition and considering only comparable cohorts.15 When we do
that, we find that the pure population effect (migration plus demographic effects)
reduced rural poverty by 1.56 million, while the reduction in rural incidence in the
remaining rural population reduced it by an additional 2.5 million (there is a
substantial cross product term because of the length of the time period under
consideration).
The point here is that if we think that the surveys of 2004 and 2012 are roughly
representative, about five eighths of the overall reduction in rural poverty of those
alive in 2004 came from poverty reduction in the population that stayed in the
countryside, and only 3/8 from the reduction in the rural population from all causes
including both death and rural–urban migration.
This is important because it says that for the most part poverty reduction in the
countryside was not because people left to go to the towns and cities, but rather
because incomes rose for those who remained. This point will be supported by the
mobility analysis presented below.
4 Mobility matrices
The equivalent cohort data we have assembled can be used to construct some useful
mobility matrices that will show the movement of population between the rural and
urban sectors and between the Sierra-Selva and the coast. For each of our four
cohorts, we subdivided our sample by rural–urban and by region (Sierra-Selva and
Coast). Since we already know the rate at which each cohort declines due to death,
outmigration from Peru and sampling error, we can make a very good estimate of
the movement of each cohort across the four cells into which we have divided the
country. We are going to call the resulting table a mobility matrix.
Since the four categories probably have a substantial income overlap, these
matrices are not exactly the same as the usual mobility matrix. What they do
represent is the transition of the Peruvian population from the lowest average
income subcomponent—the rural Sierra-Selva to the highest—the coastal urban
subcomponent. That being the case one can think of upward mobility being
represented by the entries in the upper right off diagonal elements of the matrix and
downward mobility by the lower left off-diagonals (see Table 7).
We show the matrices for all four cohorts and the national total in Table 7. For
the row and column sums for each sub-category and for each bold diagonal entry we
know the original population in 2004 and the observed population in 2012. The
14 Table 8 gives the data on which the decomposition is based.
15 See Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). Any observed change in income can be rewritten as the change
in average earnings at the original population level plus the change in population at the original earnings
level plus the changes in population times the changes in earnings.
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column sums in the table are the observed totals for each component in 2012, and
the row sums are the observed totals in 2004. The bold diagonal entries are an
estimate of the members of the original cell who were still in that cell 8 years later.
Thus, for example, we see that in 2004 there were about 3.5 million 0–25-year-olds
in the rural Sierra-Selva. If there was no net migration to the rural Sierra-Selva, 2.9
Table 7 Rural–urban mobility matrix
ss rural Coast rural ss-urban Coast urban Total
For 0–25-year-olds in 2004
ss rural 2,936,960 0 552,479 0 3,489,439
Coast rural 0 391,906 259,753 51,221 702,880
Sierra urban 0 0 3,128,370 0 3,128,370
Coast urban 0 0 0 7,112,561 7,112,561
Total 2,936,960 391,906 3,940,602 7,163,782 14,433,250
For 26–40-year-olds in 2004
ss rural 979,103 0 9,925 0 989,028
Coast rural 0 152,179 175,072 0 327,250
Sierra urban 0 0 993,709 0 993,709
Coast urban 0 0 379,015 3,217,444 3,596,459
Total 979,103 152,179 1,557,720 3,217,444 5,906,446
For 41–60-year-olds in 2004
ss rural 949,353 0 82,598 0 1,031,951
Coast rural 0 125,038 102,855 0 227,893
Sierra urban 0 0 1,036,687 0 1,036,687
Coast urban 0 0 146,341 3,011,906 3,158,247
Total 949,353 125,038 1,368,482 3,011,906 5,454,779
For ?60-year-olds in 2004
ss rural 436,574 0 71,692 0 508,266
Coast rural 53,440 24,619 14,915 92,974
Sierra urban 0 0 451,227 0 451,227
Coast urban 0 0 0 1,095,551 1,095,551
Total 436,574 53,440 547,538 1,110,466 2,148,018
National
ss rural 5,301,990 0 716,694 0 6,018,684
Coast rural 0 722,563 562,299 66,136 1,350,997
Sierra urban 0 0 5,609,994 0 5,609,994
Coast urban 0 0 525,356 14,437,462 14,962,818
Total 5,301,990 722,563 7,414,343 14,503,598 27,942,493
Source: author’s worksheet
ss refers to Sierra-Selva region. Note also these are the survivors from 2004 in the survey of 2012. They
are directly comparable to Table 8. Note also that the totals in each row are the 2004 population while the
column totals show where this same population was in 2012
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million were still there 8 years later, which means that about 550,000 of the original
group must have moved to one of the other three cells.
To help understand how these matrices were developed, consider the rural coast
for the 0–25-year-old age group. Since it lost almost half of its population, we set all
its inflow columns at zero. Next consider the urban coast. Overall its population was
almost constant between 2004 and 2012. Since the urban sierra was the one area
with a large population inflow, we set the outflow from the urban sierra to the rural
coast at zero. That means that all the net increase in the urban coast (51,000) had to
have come from the rural coast.16 But, by simple subtraction that determines the
flow from the rural coast to the urban sierra (260,000). That in turn determines the
residual flow from the rural to the urban sierra (552,000). The other age cohort
matrices were developed in a similar manner.
Look now at the evidence. There are several patterns in the national table to note
here. The first is the tremendous attractive force of the urban Sierra-Selva area. It
started the period with a population of 5.6 million and ended with 7.4 million. It
drew many of those from the rural areas of the region, but many also came from the
coast, both rural and urban because there simply were not enough migrants from
within the sierra to match the observed increase in the urban population.
Another pattern is the predominance of the young in the rural–urban
migration flow within the sierra and the role of older migrants from the coast.
Altogether some 717,000 out of the 1.8 million increase in the urban population
of the Sierra came from the rural Sierra. Of those, 77% were in the 0–25-year age
group. Most of these must have been young people coming with their families
from the rural areas surrounding the urban centers of the Sierra-Selva.
Conversely, the coastal area supplied almost 1.1 million migrants to the
population of the urban Sierra.17 74% of those were between 25 and 60. Many
must have been in the labor force responding to rising employment opportunities
in the urban Sierra.
Finally there is little or no evidence of net migration (of the 2004 population) to
the urban areas of the coast. Indeed there is some outmigration from the urban coast
to the Sierra. This is a surprising result but not necessarily inconsistent with the
notion of rapid urban growth at the coast. Recall that what we have here is
equivalent cohorts which means that they exclude the 0–8-year-old age group of
2012, many of which must be on the coast. But barring sampling error, outmigration
or differential death rates, regional migration favored the urban Sierra-Selva over all
other regions of the country.
4.1 A rural–urban poverty mobility matrix
The population movements between the rural and urban sectors can be combined
with our poverty by equivalent cohorts data to generate a second set of mobility
matrices that give us an estimate of the transition of the 2004 population by their
16 Remember that these figures are net which means that we assume no ‘‘churning’’—that is no outflow
of migrants from the cell and replacement by an inflow from another cell.
17 562,300 ? 525,356 = 1,087,000.
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place of origin and 2004 poverty status. The household surveys give us the
distribution of the 2004 and 2012 populations by equivalent cohort and their rural or
urban location. We also know the distribution of each equivalent cohort’s poverty
rates for 2004 and 2012. Since we also know from Table 9 how many of the each
2004 cohort moved from the rural to the urban sector, we can estimate the number
of people who moved from each cell to each other cell of an expanded mobility
matrix.18 We construct such a matrix for our four equivalent cohorts and show the
result in Table 8. The ijth row in the matrix shows the number of people in the ith
row in 2004 who move to column j in 2012. Thus, for example, in the 0–25-year age
cohort, the top left-hand entry shows the number of people who were classified as
rural poor in 2004 and remained in the rural poor group in 2012. As in Table 7, each
row sum is the observed number of poor or non-people by rural and urban in 2004
while the column sums show the 2012 sums for the same categories. Note that the
estimates have to be consistent with Table 7 and with the observed urban and rural
poverty indices by equivalent cohort for 2004 and 2012.
It is worthwhile to stop for a moment to understand how the matrix was
constructed and what it tells us. Take the matrix for the 0–25 cohort (it is the 8–33
cohort of 2012). In 2004, there were 4.2 million 0–25s in the rural sector.19 89% of
them were poor.20 (3.7/(3.7 ? 0.474). We also know from the later survey that there
were only 3.3 million still in the rural sector in 2012, of which 1.8 million were
poor.21 If we assume that none of the rural non-poor of 2004 became poor (i.e., no
net downward mobility) then we know the diagonal entry in row two (474,000).
Since we know the overall rural population of 2012, and the poverty rate, we know
the total number in the rural sector who were not poor in 2012 (1.5 million). Since
we assume no net downward mobility, the number of the rural poor of 2004 who
escaped from poverty but remained in the rural sector is 1.052 million (1.526
million–0.474 million). Now the sum of the rural to urban migration for the rural
poor of 2004 is determined. It is 863,000.22 We can now set the fraction of those
who joined the urban poor such that the overall observed urban poverty rate for the
equivalent cohort for 2012 is consistent with what was observed in the household
survey. Obviously this procedure depends on our assumption that there is no net
downward mobility in either the rural or urban sectors. That is what permits us to
put zeros in the relevant cells of the matrix and calculate the rest of the entries in the
matrix such that the totals are consistent with the observed poverty levels in 2012.
With all this as an explanation of how the poverty mobility matrices were
constructed, what can we learn about rural poverty reduction in Peru? First, looking
at the national totals in Table 8, we see that there was tremendous progress made in
18 The data do not permit us to make a confident estimate of a mobility matrix including poverty and the
coast-Sierra disaggregation. However, recall that 89% of rural poverty in 2004 was in the Sierra-Selva
regions, so what happens to national rural poverty is likely to be reflective of the mobility of the rural poor
in the Sierra-Selva.
19 3.7 million plus 0.47 million.
20 This percentage comes from the household surveys.
21 This is the total rural population in 2012 (1.8 million plus 1.5 million).
22 0.15 million plus 0.71 million.
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rural poverty reduction among those who were poor in 2004. That is true in both the
rural and urban sectors. There were 6.3 million rural poor in 2004. 46% of them or
almost three million got out of poverty over the period.23
Table 8 Rural–urban poverty mobility matrix
Poverty mobility matrix by rural–urban
Rural poor Rural non-poor Urban poor Urban np Total
0–25
Rural poor 1,802,798 1,051,787 150,000 713,453 3,718,038
Rural non-poor 0 474,281 0 0 474,281
Urban poor 0 0 1,789,064 3,790,907 5,579,971
Urban np 0 0 0 4,660,961 4,660,961
Total 1,802,798 1,526,068 1,939,064 9,165,321 14,433,250
26–40
Rural poor 590,092 314,726 40,000 144,997 1,089,815
Rural non-poor 0 226,463 0 0 226,463
Urban poor 0 0 744,290 1,363,400 2,107,690
Urban np 0 0 0 2,482,478 2,482,478
Total 590,092 541,189 784,290 3,990,875 5,906,446
41–60
Rural poor 483,834 349,922 22,000 163,453 1,019,209
Rural non-poor 0 240,636 0 0 240,636
Urban poor 0 500,754 1,131,524 1,632,278
Urban np 0 2,562,656 2,562,656
Total 483,834 590,557 522,754 3,857,633 5,454,779
C61
Rural poor 262,353 105,554 18,000 93,226 479,133
Rural non-poor 0 122,107 0 0 122,107
Urban poor 0 241,532 307,702 549,233
Urban np 0 0 997,545 997,545
Total 262,353 227,661 259,532 1,398,472 2,148,018
National
Rural poor 3,139,077 1,821,989 230,000 1,115,129 6,306,195
Rural non-poor 0 1,063,486 0 0 1,063,486
Urban poor 0 0 3,275,640 6,593,532 9,869,172
Urban np 0 0 0 10,703,640 10,703,640
Total 3,139,077 2,885,475 3,505,640 18,412,301 27,942,493
Source: author worksheets. Italicized numbers are observed in the surveys. Note that these are the
survivors from 2004 in the survey of 2012. They are directly comparable to Table 6. The totals in each
row are the 2004 population while the column totals show where this same population was in 2012
23 1.8 million plus 1.1 million.
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Second, it is instructive that 1.8 million or 62% of the group that got out of
poverty stayed in the rural sector. In other words, almost two thirds of rural poverty
reduction was due to increases in rural family income not rural–urban migration. If
you were poor in 2004, you did not have to move to town to get out of poverty. This
is consistent with the Oaxaca decomposition discussed earlier. Third, among the
rural poor, it was the young who migrated—64% of total rural–urban migration of
the poor came from the 0–25 cohort even though it comprised less than 60% of the
rural poverty population in 2004.24
4.2 Who migrates?
We can say more about the age characteristics of those who migrate from the rural
to the urban sector. Since we have a sample and not a census, we cannot expect that
the observed cohorts will be identical. But they should be close and indeed they are,
except for the oldest cohort where deaths significantly reduce the size of the cohort
in 2012.25 To make the two populations exactly equal, we adjust the observed 2012
cohort figures by the percentage difference between the expected and the actual
populations of 2012. We then apply the adjustment factors to the observed rural and
urban populations separately. This means that we assume that the sampling error is
the same in the urban and the rural sectors or equivalently we assume the same
death rates and weighting errors in the urban and the rural sector. With that we have
the following breakdown of rural to urban migration by the age cohorts of 2004 (see
Table 9). Note that the totals add up to the observed rural and urban populations of
2012 as adjusted by the death rates. Note also that we identify the cohorts by their
ages in 2004. Thus, the cohort 0–25 in 2004 is the cohort aged 9–33 in 2012. The
implication of this adjustment procedure is that we can now distribute across the
rural and urban sectors the 2004 population which was still alive in 2012.
The main point of this exercise will be to show that the great majority of rural to
urban migration between 2004 and 2012 has to have been in the age cohort 0–25 in
2004. They comprise 64% of the total rural to urban migration between 2004 and
2012. It is the young who migrate. Since the young typically have higher than
average poverty rates, this by itself will tend to pull down rural poverty rates. It also
means that gradually the share of the young in the rural population will decline.
Not only can we show that it is the young who migrate. We can also show that it
is the better educated among the young who migrate. In Table 10, we show the
proportion of the rural population in the two young cohorts of 2004 with either
complete or incomplete primary or secondary education and the education levels of
those same cohorts in the rural sector 8 years later. In 2004, in the 16–25-year-old
rural cohort 42% had primary school or less and 51% had at least some high school.
Eight years later, of those in the rural sector in that same cohort the primary school
share had grown to 49% while the high school share had fallen to 40%. The only
24 That is (150 ? 713)/(230 ? 1115) = 0.64.
25 The differences are small. For the 0–25 cohort, the actual population is 0.98 of the expected, for 26–4
it is 0.93, for the cohort 41–60 it is 0.96 and for the 60? it is 0.76.
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way that could happen is if the better educated in each cohort migrated, raising the
cohort share of the less educated left behind in the rural sector.
If we put this evidence together with the education data from Table 10, one can
guess that the better educated young rural parents brought their families to town to
give them better educational opportunities. The resulting outflow of workers from
the rural sector might then have raised the wages and incomes of those who were
left behind, permitting the reductions in rural poverty that we observed in Tables 5
and 6. If our conjecture here is accurate, more attention should be paid to
educational migration as a promising way to reduce rural poverty rate, even among
those who remain in the rural sector.
The reason that the progress in rural poverty reduction is not more obvious in the
published statistics is that the rural 0–25 cohort of 2004 is replaced by a new 0–25
cohort in 2012 and it contains a new 0–8 age group with a 36% poverty rate. In other
words, from the point of view of Peruvian society, observed rural poverty does not
fall nearly as fast as it does for the group of people who were poor in a particular
year. The reason is that there is a constant replacement at the bottom of the income
pyramid by a new group of the young, and that group continues to have relatively
high rates of poverty. When one looks at equivalent cohorts instead of certain age
groups, the difference is clear. For example, if you were young, poor and in the rural
Table 9 Equivalent cohort population by location in 2004 and 2012










Rural Urban Total Rural Urban
0–25 4,192,318 10,240,932 14,433,250 3,328,866 11,104,384 863,453 0.64
26–40 1,316,278 4,590,167 5,906,445 1,131,281 4,775,164 184,996 0.14
41–60 1,259,845 4,194,934 5,454,779 1,074,391 4,380,388 185,453 0.14
60? 601,240 1,546,778 2,148,018 490,014 1,658,004 111,226 0.08
total 7,369,681 20,572,811 27,942,492 6,024,553 21,917,939 1,345,128 1.00
Source: author’s worksheet based on INEI household surveys. Note that the 2012 population is adjusted
by the observed survival rates by cohort
Table 10 Percentage of rural with primary and secondary education
Cohort Percentage of rural with primary and secondary education
2004 2012 Primary Secondary
2004 2012 2004 2012
16–25 24–33 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.40
26–40 34–48 0.65 0.70 0.28 0.25
Source: author’s worksheet
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sector in 2004, there was a 47% chance that you would escape from poverty over the
next 8 years.26 If you were in the 26–40 age group of the rural poor in 2004, you had
a 42% chance of becoming non-poor in 2012. Even if these probabilities are not as
large as they were for the urban sector, they still indicate a very substantial amount
of poverty reduction and upward mobility in the rural sector. Politically, the sort of
improvement in the prospects of the poor that can be found by looking at equivalent
cohorts may be more important than the continuation of high levels of measured
poverty and inequality.
5 Conclusions
What we found in Peru was a very dynamic, growing economy successfully
increasing income per capita across the board. Most of the gains flowed to the urban
sector, but the growth was rapid enough to draw a lot of the rural population out of
the rural sector to higher paying opportunities in the urban sector. Most of that rural
to urban migration appears to have been within the Sierra-Selva not from the
highlands to the coast. The result was dramatic upward mobility for the rural poor of
our base year 2004. Using our equivalent cohorts approach we were able to show
that for those who were young and in the rural sector in 2004, even though their
poverty rate was 89% in that year, 47% got out of poverty over the next 8 years.
Thus, high reported rates of rural poverty could and did exist along with rapid
upward mobility for the poor of a particular year. That mobility is obscured by
young new entrants whose poverty remained relatively high.
We disaggregated the changes in rural income per capita to better understand the
sources of the rapid gains enjoyed by the rural population. The data clearly show
that most of the gains came from rising earnings, rather than specific poverty
targeted transfer programs or the growth of agriculture. Altogether 80% of the
change in rural income came from increased earnings. When we dug deeper we
were able to show that most of the remaining 20% came from a substantial
reduction in the number of dependents per rural worker. That added about 15% to
reported rural income per capita. Outmigration from the rural sector which was
large, only directly accounted for 4% of the overall growth in rural incomes. It was
not so much that there were fewer rural workers. It is that the reduction in the labor
force raised the wages for those who chose to remain the rural sector.
This increase in rural earnings was not led by agriculture. It was mainly because
of a general rise in wages across industrial and services activities within the rural
population, coupled with a massive movement of the better educated from the rural
to the urban areas of the Sierra and Selva. Better educated workers and their families
particularly young families were pulled out of the rural areas and the rapid overall
growth rate of the economy permitted an increase in average wages both in the
urban receiving areas and for the smaller labor force left behind in the rural sector.
The general rise in wages extended from the urban to all the activities in the rural
areas, not just those in agriculture. Thus, Peru looks more like a case of ‘‘a rising
26 (1051 ? 713)/3718.
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tide lifts all boats’’ than a case of successful specific poverty reduction
interventions. These patterns are likely to continue to be true, particularly given
the difficult natural conditions of agriculture in the Sierra and the relatively small
amount of arable land available there.
Peru shows that even a growth strategy and investments in education which
mainly benefitted the urban sector helped the rural poor as well. Maintaining rapid
growth along with continued improvements in education is probably the most
effective anti-poverty program that could be implemented. A decade of rapid overall
growth and educational migration did more to reduce rural poverty than targeted
poverty programs. Peru invested heavily in education in the Sierra and Selva. What
that did was to permit the better educated young to move to adjoining urban areas
where the mobility data show a quite dramatic move out of poverty by those rural–
urban migrants as well as those who remained in the rural area.
It is also important to devise better metrics to measure progress, Simple statistics
or comparisons of poverty rates over time are misleading and understate the real
progress that has been made. Following given groups of people over time using
panels or alternatively equivalent cohorts or mobility matrices gives a more
complete picture of the dramatic changes that are taking place.
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